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Abstract 
  
The EU has been involved in influencing major infrastructure in the fields of transport and 
energy mainly by means of the TENs programme begun in the 1990s.  Other macro planning 
and wider spatial planning exercises, including the ESDP, made reference to such 
infrastructure systems, particularly in relation to the need for connectivity and mobility, but 
normally did not attempt to intervene in an area seen as one of the prerogatives of national 
states. Much more important have been the wider programmes of liberalisation pressed by the 
EU since the 1980s, but these have had no specific geographical content.   
 
A revision of the TENs programmes since 2008 has led to proposals to increase the role of 
the EU, by drawing up continent wide schemas indicating needs for future investment in 
many fields of both transport and energy, and introducing new procedures to streamline 
decision making by designating projects as of European interest.   The initiatives in transport 
and energy are described here, including the two Regulations currently under discussion 
within the EU institutions.  These include major proposals for cross European multi-modal 
transport corridors within an EU core network, and regional schemas for energy drawn up 
primarily by energy industries and government counterparts.  Both are likely to be of real 
significance for spatial planners throughout the continent, and have major impacts on the 
shapes of future infrastructure networks. 
 
These proposals are analysed, as cases of the rescaling and re-ordering of government, giving 
more force to the EU in these fields, and reinforcing sectoral or silo based decision making.  
It is argued that somewhat different outcomes will result in the few areas, such as the Baltic, 
where long term macro-regional collaboration has been present, from the rest of Europe, 
where these sectoral programmes may complicate further the mix of planning impacting on 
each region, making even more confused the accountability of governance.  Suggestions are 
made for the careful assessment of these schemas by national and regional governments, and 
for the creation of some spatial planning analytical capability at EU level, which could 
examine this type of proposals, with powerful spatial impacts.   
 
 
Introduction 
Infrastructural investment has recently become a part of planning policy which has been 
attracting more attention, both amongst policy makers and academics (Fischer 2012, 
Flyvbjerg et al 2003, HM Treasury 2011, Marshall 2012a,b, OECD 2006, 2011, Priemus et al 
2008).  This attention results in large part from the perception that the planning and approval 
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of large infrastructure schemes has been becoming more difficult, across many countries.  
Sometimes this generates calls for streamlined permittting processes, which are expected to 
give approvals faster, whilst sometimes the call is to look rather more dispassionately at the 
overall circumstances and consider alternative approaches in the round.  Up until the last few 
years, these policy debates have been occurring largely at national level.  But since about 
2008, the European Union has put a strong emphasis on the issue, as part of its revision of the 
Trans European Networks (TENs) policy area.  This paper has its main focus on this policy 
development, and the overall purpose is to excavate the relationships that the TENs reforms 
may have in the future with spatial planning within the EU.   
 
Comparative work on the way in which different European states manage infrastructure 
planning made clear the weak steering capacities or desires in most cases (Marshall 2012a).  
Such weakness was observed in Germany for example, where the planning of energy systems 
showed little direction, arguably hindering the possibility of serious progress to a lower 
carbon society.  Equally there were many German criticisms (Hesse 2010), showing 
government inability to adopt a more strategic approach to transport planning, as against the 
business as usual of the federal transport plan (BVWP).  An important question arising from 
this is how far the EU may be making up for these steering weaknesses in some respects.  
This interest was one motivation behind the work reported on here. 
 
The specific questions under examination are the following: 
Firstly, what is the relationship between the TENs reforms and spatial planning?  This is 
explored in three dimensions.  The first looks at the way in which the reforms have been 
formulated, and to what extent links have been made with any spatial or territorial thinking 
within EU processes.  The second looks at possible impacts on spatial planning, in the short 
and medium term.  The third discusses the scope for longer term impacts, via the more 
indirect effects on the way territories are imagined. 
 
Secondly, given the answers to these questions, which will shed light on the nature of the 
links and impacts of the TENs reforms, how far can these be explained by features of the 
governance and management of infrastructure steering in Europe, at all levels?  Here the 
discussion will focus on relatively familiar processes within European governing, such as 
rescaling, decision making within sectoral silos, and the decline of spatial planning at wider 
scales in many countries. 
 
The paper is organised around these two questions.  Before moving to examine the 
dimensions of the first question, an introduction is given to the TENs policy field, followed 
by a description of the proposed reforms.  The paper concludes by summarising the answers 
to the questions, and discusses possible ways to make the relationship between the TENs 
reforms and spatial planning more fruitful. 
 
The paper is based on interviews conducted in the European Commission in Brussels in late 
2010, backed by some discussions to update the analysis in 2012. It also draws on extensive 
use of the very full documentation of the EU directorates involvedi.  On the basis of the 
understanding generated of the making of the new TENs policies, it was possible to explore 
the possible impacts on spatial planning.  The article is therefore primarily based on a 
combination of reporting on current policy making at EU level, and reflecting on this policy 
making, drawing on experience gained in a research project on planning for major 
infastructure undertaken in 2008-2010 (reported on fully in Marshall 2012a). 
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The TENs programmes 
Large schemes to transform transport and energy infrastructure have been recently under 
consideration across Europe (supergrids from Africa to northern Europe, motorways of the 
sea linked to cross continental freight routes, for example), following national level 
investment in several fields since the 1990s – in high speed rail, motorways, ports and 
airports, as well as gas, wind and other energy generation sectors.  Whilst such continental 
wide schemes have a long historyii, the present round was spurred in part by the pressure of 
leading business executives in the 1980s, who identified “missing links” in all European 
transport systems (European Round Table 1984, 1991).  The making of the single market 
project thus came to carry with it an interest in boosting the capacity of European transport 
systems.  This combined with, or in part was inherent in, the liberalisation of the industries, 
mostly state owned, which for several decades had managed these infrastructure systems.  
This liberalisation became a core EU goal in the 1990s.  Other more material factors were 
involved of course, such as the increasing freight movement across the world, impacting on 
ports and much else, a growth process predicted to continue (OECD 2006, 2007, 2011).  One 
result was the creation of the TENs programme in the early 1990s, seen as a part of the 
Delors package which sought to modify or tame the single market programme. The idea 
behind TENs was that, with the Single Market, more traffic of all kinds would flow between 
countries and that transport and energy systems, like productive systems, ought to be 
harmonised and opened up to competition, to cope with the greater movement.  Unlike the 
social programme also promoted by Delors, the TENs packages were progressively detailed 
and, on the transport side, given significant EU funding support.   
 
In 1994 fourteen priority transport schemes were listed, to be extended to thirty by 2004.  
Most of this top set were rail schemes, with limited support for road and aviation, although 
these figured strongly in the sets of schemes in the rest of the listings. This leaning towards 
more environmentally desirable modes was another part of the political drive of the policy 
zone, ensuring some support from political groups interested in environmental gains.  
However environmental critics have shown that such environmental presentation is not the 
main drive of EU transport support:  “The modal bias in favour of rail in the TEN-T funds 
has been far overshadowed by spending on roads and airports via cohesion policy” (Transport 
and Environment et al 2011 p.4).   
 
Figure 1 shows the extent of the TEN-T programme in 2008 (CEC 2009c).  There was a 
commitment to some financial support, mainly via loans – in fact the EU paid 29% of the 
total invested 1993-2006, with a similar proportion expected in 2007-2013 (CEC 2008a).  
Apparently the EU was committing 230 billion euros to transport infrastructure between 1996 
and 2013 – a major contribution, most channelled by regional funding (CEC 2011e). As Duhr 
et al explain: “The process of selecting priority projects was a highly political exercise ‘from 
the bottom up’, characterised by pressures from national governments or industrial lobbies 
pushing for their national wish lists” (2010 p. 300, also Peters 2003). 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
The TENs scheme for energy also advanced through the 1990s, but with less political drive 
and little financial support.  It gradually picked up momentum, mostly to ease cross border 
links in gas and electricity transport, to facilitate the single market in these products being 
introduced at the same time.  Both programmes had a “fill the gaps” approach, rather than 
one in any way related to strategic cross-European planning.  Given the slow progress with 
even this level of intervention, there was for years quite enough for the EU to do in trying to 
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get effective implementation.   By 2008 some of the original priority projects had still hardly 
begun.  Nevertheless, it was felt the time was right to review progress and adopt a more 
ambitious approach.   
 
At the same time, spatial planning was making its bid to impact on EU policy making, by 
means of work on a cross European spatial framework, finally issued in 1999 as the European 
Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), as well as through work on mega regional 
planning overviews, and support for cross border iniatives via INTERREG programmes.  The 
now clear accounts of this story (Duhr et al 2010, Faludi and Waterhout 2002, Faludi 2010) 
show how variable and often limited the integration of this spatial planning work was to key 
policy areas – the big funding programmes, transport and energy policies, competition policy 
and so on.   However, the work on spatial planning, now generally rebadged as territorial 
cohesion policy, continued through the 2000s (CEC 2008c).   It is important to investigate 
any links between the continuing aspirations for some sort of territorial integration in the EU, 
and the TENs reforms which were worked up in 2008-2011 and are now in the process of 
being hardened into firm policy, including Regulations in the transport and energy fields.  It 
is equally important to establish what may be the significance of the TENs reforms for the 
changing European geography, that is to think about what major initiatives like this do 
“behind the back of planning”, in generating the future shapes of urbanisation and 
environmental futures, and how the future territory of Europe is imagined. 
 
Reforming the TENs systems 2008-2012 
 
The reforms are examined separately for transport and energy (telecoms is omitted, as much 
less significant from a planning perspective). The account here largely reflects policy making 
up to mid-2012. 
 
Transport 
The TEN-T programme review began in 2007-8, and resulted in a final Commission proposal 
for a new policy in 2011 (CEC 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2010b, c, e, 2011a, b, Fischer and Sykes 
2009).  The primary innovation was the making of a “core network” of routes, in multi-modal 
form, across the EU and connecting with third countries.  This would supercede the project 
based approach used since the creation of the TEN-T in the early 1990s.   The core was to 
include all modes, with a study identifying 57 ports or port complexes which should be the 
key port links to the terrestrial transport system (NEA 2010).  The 30 projects agreed at the 
last revision in 2005 would mostly slot into such a core network, along with some more, but 
this time the result is supposed to be a genuine base network for the whole continent, not a 
patchwork of projects.  Underlying this, the “comprehensive network” will continue, slightly 
amended, this being the main existing transport systems marked on a map, and showing the 
“missing links” still seen as needing connections or improvements.  It must be remembered 
that this is a substantial existing project, which there is no intention of reducing, on the 
contrary it will be added to somewhat.  As a working document  (CEC 2010e) said: 
“Today the comprehensive network comprises altogether 95,700 km of road links, 106,000 
km of railway links (including 32,000 km of high-speed links), 13,000 km of inland 
waterways, 411 airports and 404 sea ports. It has to be noted that most of these links and 
nodes already exist. However, almost 20,000 km of the road links, over 20,000 km of railway 
link (overwhelmingly high-speed lines) and 600 km of inland waterway links remain to be 
built or substantially upgraded”. 
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The choice of the core network was based on a much more planned approach, through a 
methodology worked up in 2010-11 by an expert group, essentially based on linking key 
nodes of the European transport system.  This meant in particular a big emphasis on ports and 
on freight, and the resulting ten corridors concentrate especially on rail links, with a major 
aim to encourage modal shift from road to rail and water.   Figure 2 shows part of the core 
network, that for rail freight.  The core network was to be given priority, with a chance to get 
some of the 50 billion euro Connecting Europe Facility announced at the same time (31 
billion for transport, 9 billion each for energy and telecoms). It was also targeted for 
completion by 2030, as against 2050 for the comprehensive network. 
 
Figure 2 about here. 
 
The new way of dealing with the core network was through the creation of “Corridor 
Development Platforms”, consisting of a European Coordinator appointed by the EU to lead 
the work on that corridor, and of member states and relevant interests.  They were to draw up 
a corridor development plan within six months of the entry into force of the Regulation.  This 
was to be submitted to the Commission, who would give its opinion, and particularly say in 
what way it was going to support implementation.   As an example, Corridor 2 runs from 
Warsaw to the English Midlands, and needs upgrading of rail lines along much of the route, 
as well as inland waterways works in Germany and at the Amsterdam locks, and port and 
multimodal platform works in England.  Here four states will be involved, but in some 
corridors such as the north-south ones, governance will be more complex still. Figure 3 
shows another example, for the Genoa-Rotterdam corridor. 
 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
These transport infrastructure proposals (and much more) are now presented in a Regulation, 
the form of EU legislation which, if approved, becomes directly binding on members.  There 
will then be little scope for deviation, in principle, and all future investment should be guided 
by or be taking note of the TENs schemas – in principle for the coming decades, though we 
may fully expect regular revision.  Of course the Regulation may not be approved, at least in 
its current form.  Under the co-decision procedure, first the European Parliament needs to 
give its approval.  At the time of writing there were several elements that looked 
controversial, with the Council preferring a more government (transport ministries) centred 
governing mechanism, and pressures from Green interests in the Parliament against other 
elements of the package. 
 
Energy 
For the TEN-E field, policy development began by 2008 (CEC 2008b, Ramboll/Mercados 
2008) and Commission documents were published late in 2010, including on energy 
infrastructure (CEC 2010f, i, j), followed by the final policy package in October 2011 (CEC 
2011c).   The final TEN-E proposals are wide ranging and significant, though in a different 
way from those for transport, given the very different context of energy policy making.  The 
infrastructure strand of energy policy relates strongly to the coming into force early in 2011 
of the Third Energy Package.  This liberalises European energy systems, with full unbundling 
of energy transport systems in particular.   
 
There are two strands of special interest to spatial planners (CEC 2011c, the proposed 
Regulation, contains most details, but much related documentation is on the Energy 
directorate webpages for the October 2011 announcement).  The first strand is the designation 
6 
 
of projects of common European interest (PCIs) and how these are identified.  This is a 
strong stepping up of the EU role, responding to the worry that a liberalised pan European 
energy work will simply not have the technical infrastructure to work, particularly given the 
low carbon and security goals that the new competitive industries are also supposed to 
achieve.  The projects are chosen by the Regional Groups for each fuel body, those created 
under the Third Package: ENTSO-E for electricity and ENTSOG for gas.  Figure 4 shows the 
regional groupings created for electricity.  These groups have been doing planning work since 
their formation in 2009, in the Gas Regional Investment Plans (GRIPs) for example, and this 
is set within the overarching Ten Year Network Development Plans (TYNDPs) prepared for 
both electricity and gas by their respective bodies (Entso-e 2012, Entsog 2011).  So the 
energy field also has priority corridors, based on the ENTSO work, there being four each for 
electricity and gas, and one for oil, as well as three thematic areas, for smart grids, electricity 
highways (a long term super grid) and a cross-border carbon dioxide network. 
 
Figure 4 about here. 
 
The TYNDP for gas of 2011 (Entsog 2011) followed the Entso-e approach in its first iteration 
the year before by not just listing the responses of the transmission operator of each country, 
but carrying out a “top down” research of the matching of supply and infrastructure systems 
to 2020.  It admitted this was full of important uncertainties, but concluded that if the 
committed investments went ahead, there were only relatively limited areas of major risk in 
the event of disruptions, mainly on the eastern borders affected by Russian gas risks.  These 
“Plans” were described in the gas case as intended to “provide stakeholders with signals that 
can be further investigated in their decision-making processes for market triggered 
investment or for European funding” (Entsog 2011 p. 51).   But the evidence now is that the 
planning is getting a little less cautious, reaching at least indicative status, even though the 
TYNDPs are definitely not binding documents. In due course it is expected that the Entsos 
will be able to take over all the planning and prioritising role, though in 2010 their limited 
resourcing (30-40 staff for electricity but only 4-5 for gas) did not allow this. 
 
One key is attempting to leave the planning, or at least parts, to the private industries required 
to cooperate in the Entsos.  Another is the regionalising approach, identifying areas like the 
North Sea, south west Europe, central and south eastern Europe and the Baltic as areas where 
European “added value” was most obvious or feasible.  Figure 5 shows the main challenges 
and grid issues as seen in electricity in 2012.   
 
Figure 5 about here. 
 
A second important strand in the package relates to permitting. Energy companies, and to 
some extent governments, have long been pressing loudly their concerns at delays in giving 
consent to schemes which they see as essential to getting relevant new investment, especially 
in electricity transmission lines.  Several national governments, including the UK, 
Netherlands and Germany, have reformed their procedures to make such permitting easier 
and quicker (at least that is the aim).  This can involve the appointment of “independent” 
authorities, as was tried with the Infrastructure Planning Commission in the UK, aiming to 
depoliticise decisions.  This therefore links directly to one wing of neoliberal thinking, to 
remove key decisions from electoral democratic arenas, as in the creation of autonomous 
central banks.  The EU decided to make this a big element in its infrastructure package, and 
commissioned a study in 2011 from Roland Berger, a management consultancy, to work out 
how this might be done (Roland Berger 2011 for their final report).  The result is a section in 
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the Regulation to alter procedures in all EU states, towards what is seen as best practice, 
including a one stop shop for authorisation, cutting overall maximum authorisation periods to 
three years (including one year for the offical consent process) and introducing more 
effective overseeing of the processes at both national and EU level.  There is scope for an EU 
appointed coordinator to intervene in cases where delays are serious, for projects of common 
European interest.  Much of this is advisory, as it would depend on national legislative 
change, but it represents a strong push to the sort of approach implemented in the UK with 
the Planning Act 2008, seen by the consultants as very much a template for desirable 
reformiii. 
 
The energy process is somewhat different from that for transport.  The work is ongoing, less a 
“big bang” one which aims to set future directions at one moment.  These directions for 
energy are set essentially by the industries themselves and brought together by the 
Commission, and depend on the Regional Groups for both designing priorities and 
implementation.  The extra element is some funding help, for the priority corridors.  As in the 
case of transport, the Regulation is not yet approved.  But there is a very considerable head of 
steam behind this reform, with the European Parliament committees having already in June 
2011 given a more or less green light to the proposals.  It may be even more likely than with 
transport that the essence of the Regulation will be approved in due course. 
 
The EU approach in this field is potentially powerful, creating a genuinely multi-level system 
for energy network planning, with the locus of much decision making probably shifting for 
some countries to these collaborative European institutions.  Countries like France may resist 
such a shift, but given liberalisation and takeover processes affecting the network industries, 
such resistance may not be long lasting. 
 
The reforms as a whole 
 
In substantive terms, it is important to note that the Commission and the EU remain very 
much on the “missing links” track, rather than seeking a radical comprehensive low carbon 
mobility strategy for the long term.  Certainly parts of such an agenda are referred to in the 
transport White Paper (CEC 2011a), but rapid growth remains a core part of the EU 
approach, which appears very hard to square with low carbon rhetoric. Such contradictory 
aims have equally been at the heart of the Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategies created to guide 
the EU overall since 2000 (CEC 2010a).  The energy schemas point in mixed directions: to a 
considerable extent to business as usual, continued growth in the physical networks, but with 
some emphasis on the promotion of modal shift in the core network, away from the highest 
carbon generators (road and air). Similarly in energy, there is big support for fossil fuel 
generation systems (gas, oil), as well as nuclear, but equally a drive to promote transmission 
links helping renewables.  Clearly this fits the double sided EU objectives, for growth but in 
principle with low carbon goals too. 
 
So, potentially, this is a major shift in the governance of two key features of the future of 
Europe.  Following on from the single market drive of three decades, and the liberalisation 
drive of roughly the same period (above all in infrastructure industries), these schemas give 
the EU an important role in the way big systems evolve in the future.  As usual, this is not 
creating a direct transfer of powers to the EU, but increasing the diagonal nature of decision 
making, whereby states, Commission, major corporations, and other important lobbies 
interact in the advancing (and inevitable modifying, as circumstances change) of the 
investment streams proposed.  The reasons this became necessary were precisely related to 
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the single market and liberalisation drives, which left European states without instruments to 
guide investment in these key industries to achieve their key goals – maintaining supply, 
skewing to low carbon priorities, and increasing competition where practicable, including 
between suppliers of the major fuel, gas.  The 2012 packages, if passed, are intended to 
provide the new instruments, alongside the efforts of the states and corporations.  There may 
be doubts as to the efficacy of these instruments, but ineffectiveness will be in a sense a 
political failure by the states, not supporting what they have created. 
 
The relationship between the TENs reforms and spatial planning: how the reforms were 
formulated 
 
Turning now to the first dimension of the linking to spatial planning, this is done by 
examining the process of preparation of the reforms, looking at the roles of the different 
directorates within the Commission, and the links to important aspects of territorial work, 
above all the work on “macro regional” strategies in the last few years.  It is important first to 
understand the position of the regional directorate in the Commission, which is the one 
dealing with territorial issues and so to some degree touches on spatial planning.  This will be 
followed by looking at other ways in which spatial planning may interact with these new 
policy directions.  The main focus is on the regional strategies developed in recent years, and 
what their relationship is to the evolving infrastructure fields. 
 
The regional directorate of the Commission is in some ways a powerful one, given its large 
budget, and the task of ensuring this is spent, and spent well.  But it is clear that DG Regio is 
not seen as any sort of planning body in a substantive sense.  The DG was hoping in 2010 to 
be able to strengthen its position within the Commission by aligning regional policy more 
tightly with the Europe 2020 strategy (CEC 2010a, g). The DG’s role is primarily procedural, 
ensuring the guidelines are followed, and cooperating with sectoral directorates like transport 
and energy to make sure that they are content that the criteria they set for their areas are also 
observed.  There was little sign of much cooperation on energy issues with that directorate.  
With transport there was some contribution to the working on the recent TEN-T reforms, 
with Esponiv material drawn to the attention of the policy makers there.  Given that Regio has 
itself no independent remit on which to take a view of the proper spatial development of 
Europe, there was no strong base on which to advise Transport in its drawing of the core 
network.  However, Espon did provide some valuable data foundations. 
 
The direct input to the TENs reforms from Regio was thus limited, even though normal lines 
of consultation remained fully open.  The linking of Regio to the reviews was primarily in 
relation to its core concerns of funding regional policy, and hence to major parts of the EU’s 
support for infrastructure.  So the discussion of the new funding instrument (Connecting 
Europe Facility), and how this related to the 2014-2020 budget, was a very important cross 
Commission theme, much more significant than any geographical implications.   
 
The greatest hopes have been in macro regional working, which has been seen to give real 
scope for integration in the future (CEC 2010h, l, m, Knippschild 2011, Metzger and Schmidt 
2012, Stead 2011).  Figure 6 shows the areas where this has occurred or may occur later. The 
Baltic strategy is the model here, being the first of a new breed (it was hoped by DG Regio) 
of macro-regional stategies (CEC 2009b, 2010d, Scoppetta 2012).  Faludi (2010 p.182) calls 
it “an exemplar in planning for soft spaces”.  It was prepared by a score of directorates-
general in the Commission, with DG Regio as moderator – the ideal institutional architecture 
for EU action, in Faludi’s view.  This built on a lot of work in the region since the 1990s, 
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some of which has had a strong spatial planning component.  Baltic state planning ministers 
had started on a Vision and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region (VASAB) in 1992, 
completing the strategy in 1994, and pressing on with much use of EU funds to the present.  
The latest VASAB strategy (VASAB 2009, 2010) had energy and transport as part of its three 
core areas, and laid out long term perspectives to 2030. The EU Baltic strategy benefitted 
from this spatial planning tradition and did have significant transport and energy elements.  In 
the transport sphere this involved re-emphasising long standing priorities like the Rail Baltica 
link up from Germany through the Baltic republics, and the Fehmarn-belt link from Denmark 
to Germany, as well as stressing shipping improvements, but with VASAB’s help this was 
placed in a spatial planning context.  Nevertheless, as so often, when one examines the 
regional policy funding, the biggest sums go to road building (over 18 out of 27 billion euros 
in the 2007-13 ERDF were for this purpose – CEC 2010n).  For energy the Baltic Sea Region 
Energy Cooperation, set up in 1999, had also prepared the way, and the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan of 2008 was a cornerstone, intended to reduce the energy isolation of 
the Baltic republics.  So in both areas the spatial elements and understandings were well 
developed, and a supranational sphere does appear to be in real flow, even if resulting actions 
are judged to fall well behind these understandings. 
 
Figure 6about here. 
 
A Danube strategy was launched at the end of 2010, at the request of the European Council.  
This may also develop important implications for the transport and energy fields, though at 
present the content of the Action Plan concentrates on issues easily linked to the Danube 
itself, such as the river’s navigation, and hydro power possibilities of tributaries of the river 
(CEC 2010k).  One does not get the impression of anything like the same developed spatial 
elements as in the Baltic, valuable though the experience has been so far in several ways 
(Sielker 2012).  Given that many of the bordering states are not EU members, and with the 
more difficult cohering role of just a long and winding river, this is not surprising.  
Experience will show whether this second macro-region develops a strong momentum, 
particularly in being able to cohere infrastructure plans.  The Baltic may be the odd one out.  
Larger states like France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK are not likely to be cooperative in 
this way, and they naturally dominate many of the powerful networks in the continent.  For 
the moment it looks as if seas may be the most fertile places for regional cooperation (Baltic, 
North Sea, possibly parts of the Mediterranean). 
 
The regional approach leaves scope to play across to the regional initiatives of DG Regio (see 
below) or perhaps in due course to other policy fields. However it was clear that the 
Commission is operating largely by individual sectors.  Certainly all Commission work is 
relatively collegiate, working by inter-service groupings, with all COM documents agreed 
across the Commission.  But the regional cross-sectoral implications are not considered much 
by the Energy directorate in this reform drive.  The main aims are sectoral, rather than 
integrated or territorialised: the TENs are further evidence of this reality. 
 
The relationship between the TENs reforms and spatial planning: possible impacts on spatial 
planning in the short and medium term 
 
The transport TENs reforms are, it is argued here, a major new initiative, forming in 
themselves a sort of spatial planning, which will impact on “conventional” spatial planning.  
The transport corridors core system, designed from above, on a relatively rational planned 
basis, is a radical departure for the EU, as is the form of implementation.  It is an essentially 
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transport silo/sectoral initiative, which will empower the rail and port operators and transport 
ministries in particular, but the planners on each route will surely also wish to be involved in 
the platforms, to adjust the plans to their objectives, or learn how the transport schemes 
impact on other proposals.  Although routes and implementation will be contested, it is most 
likely that planners will have to take these schemas as a committed starting point, as they are 
used to doing in most states when handed down big transport decisions by national 
governments.  But they will sometimes be able to adjust schemes, especially when these 
become politicised and negotiating on land use issues becomes critical. 
 
It is more difficult to gauge the significance of the energy TENs reforms interaction with 
spatial planning concerns, though these are clearly present, for example in marine spatial 
planning, and in the implications for the long run sustainability of different sorts of regions.  
Figure 7 shows the implications of wind farm development in the northern seas, where 
international cooperation on a possible grid is at least under discussion.  It is not so likely that 
planners will get involved in these regional groupings, which are likely to be dominated by 
the major companies and their ministry expert counterparts.  However, when difficulties 
emerge in implementation, planners may find themselves involved.   
 
Figure 7 about here. 
 
From a planning perspective, the venture into the zone of permitting is a very interesting 
initiative, representing a possibly strong incursion into national regulatory territory.  Whilst it 
is likely that a relatively soft approach will be used, perhaps not forcing member states in 
such permitting reform, a style of procedures is likely to be set by the Regulation which will 
gradually infiltrate national practice, especially where EU funding support is hoped for, 
support which will doubtless be dependent on moving towards the recommended model.  The 
energy corporations can be expected to put maximum pressure on states who do not move to 
an expedited approval model.  Whilst this is unlikely to be the precursor for the much 
discussed harmonisation of national planning regimes across Europe, it does represent a 
significant step for this rather special category of projects. 
 
It may be noted that a significant exercise in institutionalisation has been taking place in this 
policy process.  Both fields will now have European coordinators, with potentially strong 
brokerage power.  The Corridor Development Platforms for transport (if they materialise) and 
the Regional Groups for energy are important new bodies.  The Commission will be advised 
by a new committee for TEN-T, and the energy field already has ACER, the grouping of 
European national regulators.  The European Railway Agency created in 2006 is the nearest 
thing to institutionalisation in the transport field.  The drive for a single national competent 
authority for infrastructure projects will affect national institutions as well.  All this is 
strongly sectoralised, and largely invisible to the public view, as is the norm at EU level, but 
they are already, or will be, important actors in infrastructure making. 
 
These reforms could be highly significant for planners – and for all citizens.  They lay out 
geographical templates in a way that has never been done before at the continental level in 
Europe.  The move to designate a core network in transport, and articulating this as corridors, 
and the making of regional schemas in electricity, gas and to some extent for oil and for 
forms of storage, places an infrastructure overlay on the map of Europe.  The authors of the 
ESDP might be green with envy, had they been able to integrate such an overlay with other 
forces affecting locational change.  Transport infrastructure in particular could be extremely 
important over coming decades in locking in certain geographical patterns and dynamics, 
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giving locational advantage to some regions and disadvantage to others.  The same will apply 
in the energy field, but how this plays out is very uncertain, as the marketisation of energy 
investment is considerably more advanced than in the transport field.  Although the 
potentially radical decisions affecting any transition to a low carbon Europe will be extremely 
important in the long run, there must be doubts whether the TEN-E process will actually lead 
in this direction, rather than solidifying existing fossil fuel based and to an extent nuclear 
geographies.  Decisions in the key national states will be vital, especially in Germany and 
France, influenced by their large energy corporations. 
 
However the TENs reforms are far from the final steps in policy making around new 
infrastructures and cross European policy changes.  The schemas laid out in both transport 
and energy are indeed much more detailed than those attempted before, and, if these survive 
the process of horse trading between member states, and pressures from other lobbies,  this 
does leave rather less scope for subsequent detailing for planners at regional and urban levels.  
However such scope will still exist, and will be played out over the coming years as schemes 
get near to implementation, whether through the leadership of states, developers or in some 
cases EU brokered deals.  This will in many cases mean that the integrating skills of spatial 
planners will come into the frame, as a major infrastructure scheme for say a rail line or 
transmission line, only sketched in broad terms in the TEN-T or TEN-E core networks or 
regional corridors, comes into the political jurisdictions of particular states or regions or 
cities.  So even in the majority of the EU where no stronger macro regional working is 
present, there are likely to be opportunities for modest input to detailing of TENs schemes, 
and sometimes, where conflict emerges, more major roles.  
 
The relationship between the TENs reforms and spatial planning: possible impacts on spatial 
planning in the long term – ideas and imaginaries 
 
The “real” impacts on geographies are likely to be very considerable, if these packages are 
approved and implemented over the coming decades.  They are meant to be for the long term, 
with schemes to be reviewed in 5-10 years time, but looking at the horizons of 2020, 2030 
and 2050, as is no doubt appropriate for investments of this range and type.  Given the long 
life of most infrastructures of this kind, they are likely to be therefore framing life into the 
twenty second century – or involving some extremely costly write-off of mistaken 
investments, which took the continent on multiple wrong tracks.    Many of the elements of 
the schemas are likely to be contested, from contrasting positions on the political or 
philosophical spectrum – too green, not green enough, too directive, not market sensitive 
enough and so on.  However, if approved, they may over time impact on the shape of the 
continent and also how people think about that shape and shaping.  If one imagines the 
changes wrought in recent years by essentially unplanned changes in the transport systems, 
such as low cost flights from different national locations, or the evolving high speed rail 
networks, it is clear that these have changed how we think about Europe (Jensen and 
Richardson 2004, McNeill 2004).  The freight corridors and proposed energy geographies 
may be somewhat less near to the thinking of most people or opinion formers, but over time, 
the fact that say half the energy supply came from wind farms on and off shore, often within 
the jurisdiction of other countries, would create one way of thinking about our 
interdependencies.  A similar shift to locally based solar or related electricity generation 
would create another change in how we think of our ways of life geographically – a 
downscaling of imaginaries and spatial linkings. 
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A previous study of national planning and its absence generated reflections about the forming 
of such ways of thinking about big scale geographical change (Marshall 2012a).  Such 
thinking appears to have a continuing national presence in some countries, such as the 
Netherlands and France, and, if in much more negotiated and conflictual ways, in Germany 
and Spain, reflecting their federal or proto-federal natures.  It is generally resisted in the more 
peculiar hybrid UK state, as in some other countries which cannot perhaps “afford to” speak 
or think openly about their geographical nature and balances. The impossibility of an 
intelligent debate about the HS2 project (high speed rail line) in the UK, in the absence for 
over three decades of a mature spatial framing, shows how critical such absences can be in 
real world decision making.  
 
At the continental level, there can be little in the way of a shared imaginary, with horse 
trading between member states largely taking the place of any explicit consideration of what 
could or should be done where – hence the nature of EU spatial planning or its absence.  
However, the TENs schemas do seem to be a first example of placing very definite 
prioritising of corridors on maps. In debating them, fighting them, implementing them, many 
people will come into contact with the idea that say the north-south freight route across the 
Alps is important to European functioning, and its planning might usefully be shared (Hesse 
2010).  Equally, a shift to a genuinely low carbon future has a massive geographical 
component, alongside the issues of principle about fuels, external security and so on.  If there 
is to be a sensible use of the energy potentials of the North Sea, for example, planning will be 
unavoidable, with an underwater offshore transmission network looking the “obvious” course 
of action.  Nevertheless that does not mean that such planning will occur, as the large 
obstacles in its path make clear (House of Commons, Select Committee on Energy and 
Climate Change 2011).   Maritime spatial planning is emerging as a new practice, and though 
it will have specialised and technical elements, the effect over time on how everyone thinks 
about seas and their “services” to states near them, must change our geographical imaginings.   
 
This is not to argue that the TENs schemas in themselves will start to make explicit thinking 
about geographies more central to politics.  No doubt such thinking goes too near the bone of 
numerous power interests and threatens to open too many democratic and radical questions to 
wider view.  However, the simple fact of the EU getting involved in such areas may impact 
on what national states (or regions) feel they may need to do – perhaps even reinventing 
national spatial planning in the Dutch or Scottish mode.  The making of National 
Infrastructure Plans in the highly liberalised UK may be one sign of an understanding of the 
need for new kinds of national steering (HM Treasury 2010, 2011). 
 
Understanding and explaining the encounter of the TENs reforms and spatial planning 
 
So, how can this particular intersection of a set of sectoralised reforms and spatial planning 
be understood and explained?  How far can the intersection be explained by features of the 
governance and management of infrastructure steering in Europe, at all levels?   Here it is 
argued that a combination of rescaling and sectoralised policy processes goes some way to 
explain the nature of the reforms and how they are likely to play out. 
 
Geographers and political scientists have long considered the shifting of scales underway 
since the 1980s (Brenner 2004, Jessop 2002, 2008), whereby the EU has taken on more 
“meta-governance” roles, whilst leaving the states, and in some cases regions and city 
authorities, with major powers over the levers of economic and social change in their 
territories.  The single market project, and the associated “annexes” mentioned above, were 
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critical ingredients of this shifting kaleidoscope which has made the EU such a core element 
of government in the last two decades – as the post 2008 economic crisis has made ever 
clearer each year. This rescaling is linked to the difficulty in making democracy work during 
the same period, and can be seen as an attempt to depoliticise key decision making areas.   As 
was argued long ago, rescaling is often deeply political (Swyngedouw 1997).  This change in 
vertical articulation of governing can also be usefully linked to the horizontal question at the 
core of all planning, given the powerful “silo” effect in most governing systems, which, we 
have seen, is strongly present in the TENs reforms.  Between them, changes in scaling of 
governing and the extent of sectoralised policy making are critical dimensions of the way 
major infrastructure is governed in present day Europe.  This assemblage of mechanisms is 
reflected powerfully in the form of the TENs reforms and in part conditions the nature of the 
linking to spatial planning. 
  
Rescaling is variable across policy fields, as any text on the EU makes clear.  What we see 
here is a move to recalibrate governance in one field, one highly relevant to the interests of 
planners and territorial specialists.  The peculiar melange of forces that is the polity of Europe 
(states plus the EU’s institutional formulas and behaviours) has moved on again, completing 
the work of the 1980s and 1990s.  Seen as a whole, this can be seen as a further distancing of 
decisions from wider political and democratic control.  This is inherent in the project of 
neoliberalisation, which is in its essence hostile to strong democratic control of major 
decisions – such as the future shapes of countries, industries, ways of life.  If these can be 
hived off to economic decision makers remote from electoral or pressure group influence, and 
where necessary, if powers can be allocated to governance assemblages and polities which 
are equally difficult to understand, track and affect, then there is more scope for the “powers 
that be”, and less for “the many” within that governance machine.  The new structures 
created in the TENs systems appear to have much of this character. 
 
It may be said that schemes will be locally resisted, that depoliticisation never really works, 
that pressures pushed aside at one level will burst out elsewhere.  This may be true, but it 
leaves a highly uneven spread of resistances, which may have high societal costs, and may 
result in a pattern of investment to the liking of hardly anyone, and inefficient in achieving 
wider agreed goals.  The result may not be depoliticisation of investment decisions in the full 
sense, but certainly the removal of effective democratic steering over the key long term 
patterns of life.  In the long run, de-democratisation generates depoliticisation, or perhaps 
more precisely the narrowing of political life to the activities of a small range of elites 
(Flinders 2012, Hay 2007). 
 
There is a great deal more to be said on the issues of democratisation or otherwise in the EU 
and in planning, going beyond the discussion of representative and deliberative elements, to 
consider the claims of different publics and actors (Saward 2010), but this is not the place to 
enter these complex areas of political discussion. 
 
The strongly siloised or sectoralised character of the TENs schemas is another major 
ingredient which acts to form the governing ensemble managing infrastructure sectors now.   
In this it mimics normal state behaviour (Marshall 2012a).  It is normal for policy making for 
energy or transport to be highly sectoralised, often subsectoralised (for just roads, rail, ports, 
or just for gas, nuclear, renewables, oil etc).  There are exceptions, where a more integrated 
approach has been taken, as in the famed Dutch national spatial planning, or the work of the 
Grenelle in France to try to integrate across sectors.  It is true that the EU TENs efforts have 
strived to at least integrate above subsectors.  The TEN-Ts schemas are remarkable for really 
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trying to integrate freight routes, linking rail and ports above all.  And the energy schemas do 
try to make connections between different fuels and storage needs, going above the individual 
fuel sectors.  But, as we have seen, there is not much integration beyond this in a 
geographical sense, so sectoralism remains dominant. 
 
We can see therefore how new forms of policy making are being institutionalised and 
naturalised, by the shifts in scalar governance, and by the forming of organisational 
structures, deliberately created as policy silos.  This necessarily generates a separation from 
spatial planning. Whilst rescaling promotes the geographical steering of big infrastructure at a 
high, to an extent continental, scale, spatial planning’s instruments and structures have been 
cut back at national and often regional scales, and conscious comprehensive steering is 
largely absent continentally.  So a complete mismatch of policy scales is being generated.  
Furthermore, silo based policy making damages good spatial planning at all scales, cutting 
out a major way in which deliberation on societal futures could be secured within democratic 
forms.  But, as explained here, the impacts on spatial planning concerns, on real geographical 
change, occur nevertheless, and it will be up to those concerned with spatial change, 
including local and regional pressure groups, NGOs, planners and many others within local 
and regional governments, to become aware of the potential impacts of the TENs reforms 
schemas, if they are approved, on the geographical zone which interests them. 
 
Summary, and reflections on possible ways to improve the relationships between the TENs 
reforms and spatial planning 
 
In summary, it has been argued that the TENs reforms could have important impacts on 
spatial planning concerns, even though they have been prepared largely in sectoral policy 
arenas, with little effort in most parts of Europe to make links to the realities of real 
geographies with their integrated interactions (the case of macro regions like the Baltic with a 
history of big scale spatial planning deliberation, including on infrastructures, is exceptional).  
The impacts will be in part quite concrete, as the implication of a major freight route or 
energy transmission line is played down into real regions and localities.  The impacts will 
also be potentially long term, as some sort of infrastructure led imagining of Europe’s 
geographical skeleton takes root over coming decades, no doubt with many changes along the 
way to the schemas being currently discussed. 
 
In response to the second question, it has been argued that much of the way the TENs reforms 
could impact on spatial planning can be understood by analysing the ways the governing and 
policy making structure is set at all the relevant levels.  Policy making for the major 
infrastructure is being scaled upwards, whilst spatial planning at the upper scales 
(international, national, regional) is in most EU states being weakened.  Sectoralised planning 
is much stronger than any kinds of more comprehensive planning.  This interplay of scale and 
silo generates a problematic relationship between planning for major infrastructure and 
spatial planning.  Given this argument, one way to make improvements in the future would 
evidently be to tackle the various elements of this situation, but of course this would be an 
enormous challenge, given the powerful forces fuelling rescaling, and the always strong 
tendencies to policy making in sectoral terms. 
 
This paper is not primarily intended to sketch possible responses to these new ways of 
managing infrastructure investment in these two fields.  Like many observers, I am 
sympathetic to some of the substantive content (such as the goal to shift freight to more 
environmentally friendly modes, and some aspects of the facilitation of a low carbon energy 
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world), less so to other parts.  The question here is rather what link to spatial planning might 
be valuable, if any, and how that might be progressed.  The difficulty here is that the 
European polity is such a difficult species, that it is challenging to think of a way that might 
usefully link together real life concerns of populations and their democratic representatives 
and these very high level proposals.  In principle, both the whole schemas and the details in 
each corridor should be examined by national and lower authorities, in the full view of the 
public sphere.  This would, in many countries, be very difficult to do with any real evidence 
base, given the dismantling or weakening of planning capacity at most levels in many cases 
in recent years.   If critical views were extensive, this would be a message that the schemas 
needed reworking, making more integrated links to national and regional development 
aspirations.  Again, such reworking would be difficult, as many European states and regions 
may now lack clearly based goals formed from competent spatial planning processes.  Such 
national and regional strategies would be needed, in principle, so that the corridor proposals 
could be checked as to their sense in relation to these schemes – in the same manner as the 
Raumordnungsverfahren process in Germany.  Another way of putting this would be to 
subject the schemas to Territorial Impact Assessments, if such an instrument ever comes to 
exist (Bohme and Eser 2008). 
 
Beyond such a procedure, it would be valuable if the EU developed some analytical spatial 
planning capacity in order to influence the making of such sectoral schemas.  Whilst this 
might have been seen as an unnecessary luxury in the 1990s, the degree of impact and 
intervention envisaged in the TENs reforms does point to the value of such a capacity.  
Although for the moment this might be a case of closing the stable door after the horse had 
bolted, there may well be further such initiatives with major spatial implications, and the 
formation of such planning capability, well beyond the valuable but essentially research 
based input of Espon, would easily prove its worth in that case. 
 
Macro-regional strategies, as mentioned above for the Baltic and Danube, might be one 
ingredient of a more integrated approach, but it is unlikely that such strategies will become 
widespread, given the logical resistance of larger states to such stronger collaboration.  A 
fuller examination of the Baltic case and the links to current TENs packages should reveal the 
value of a continuing integrated spatial planning over many years.  But we should not hold 
our breath with the idea that such strategies will emerge elsewhere as containers for future 
planning of big infrastructure.  If that is to happen, it is more likely to occur at the national 
level, through a return to some sort of national spatial planning.  In a neoliberalising world, 
however, the real and ideological barriers to such a return are significant. 
 
Of course at a wider level, the debate is always a political one about what sort of Europe is 
desired.  Should it be a minimal budget and economy-driven model as at present (the Anglo 
Saxon form blended with some Rhineland elements, as Faludi and Peyrony 2011 have it), or 
something more like their European model, with far stronger EU policies and territorial 
cooperation?  Should it be economic growth driven and based on market dominance, or with 
more social and environmental priority? Infrastructure industries are increasingly in the 
marketised zone, and so more resistant to spatial planning, and so the current TENs packages 
fit into these givens of the EU political economy. For the moment realities seem to be that the 
main scope for a meeting with spatial planning will be in the detailed regional working – the 
Corridor Development Plans, the regional energy packages.  Planners would do well to keep 
their eyes on how these new forms develop. 
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Figure 1 
Trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) priority areas and projects in 2008 
Source:  CEC (2009) A Sustainable Future for Transport, Brussels: DG Energy and 
Transport, European Commmission 
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Figure 2 
Trans-European Transport Network:  Proposed core network, for railways (freight), ports, 
rail-road terminals (RRT),  
Source: CEC (2011) Annex to proposal for a Regulation on Union guidelines for the 
development of the trans-European transport network, COM(2011) 650 final/2, Brussels: 
European Commission. 
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Figure 3 
The Genoa - Rotterdam corridor, showing works to be completed and some completion dates 
Source: Source: CEC (2011)  List of Pre-identified projects on the core network in the field of 
transport, part of TEN-T revision package on EU webpages: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/revision-t_en.htm.  Accessed 15 August 2012. 
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Figure 4 
Regional groupings for developing analysis and proposals in ENTSO-E electricity schemas 
Source: Entso-e (2012) 10 Year Network Development Plan 2012, Brussels: Entso-e 
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Figure 5 
Future challenges and indications of grid transmission adequacy, 2012 
Source: Entso-e (2012) 10 Year Network Development Plan 2012, Brussels: Entso-e 
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Figure 6 
Likely sites of wind farm development areas, from marine spatial planning, with implications 
for long term marine grids 
Source: Entso-e, (2012) Regional Investment Plan North Sea 2012 (consultation draft March 
2012), Brussels: Entso-e 
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Figure 7 
Core areas of macro regional strategies of the European Union (existing or possible) 
Source: Duhr S (2011) Baltic Sea, Danube and macro-regional strategies: A model for 
transnational cooperation in the EU?, Brussels: Notre Europe. 
 
                                                 
i Interviews at the European Commission in 2010 included those with Helmut Adelsberger, Transport 
Directorate, Kitti Nyitrai, Energy Directorate and Jean Peyrony, Regional Directorate, as well as, by telephone, 
with John Walsh, Regional Directorate, in 2012. I was also able to speak with Andrew Price in the UK 
Department for Transport, in 2011-2012.  I am grateful to these interviewees for their help. 
ii See the fascinating historical excavation by the Making Europe project, including Badenoch and Fickers 2009,  
Schipper and van der Vleuten 2008 and van der Vleuten and Kaijser 2006. 
 
iii This Act created a new body to take decisions, the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), emphasising 
both pre-application consultation by developers, and faster decision making once an application was submitted.  
The other element of the Act was to creat National Policy Statements for each sector, to be approved by 
government.  This Act was revised by the next government in the Localism Act 2011, which abolished the IPC, 
but created a similar body within the Planning Inspectorate, although ministers again make final decisions.   
 
iv Espon is the EU supported network of spatial planning research, which since 2002 has assembled large scale 
data and analysis on European territorial trends and policies:  http://www.espon.eu 
